Maryna Starodubska, cross-cultural interaction consultant, Adjunct Professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, and author

How social norms govern our behavior

When implementing profound social change, simple solutions – punish, make an example of someone through public execution, ban, cancel, “just write it into the rules and enforce it,” and so on – not only fail to produce quick results – they cause harm and entrench the very problems they are supposed to solve. At the same time, the inclination toward simple solutions is a particular affliction of polarized, threatened societies with low levels of social trust, one of which is Ukraine. So, in two parts, let us examine how the institutional model operates in the country and what role social norms play in shaping it – using the norm of the rule of law as an example: obey the law because it is the law.

Part 1. How Social Norms Govern Our Behavior

People’s periodic failure to comply with formal requirements, such as laws and rules, is a widespread phenomenon. Until recently, its study was based on the economic analysis of individual, rational behavior without sufficient attention to behavior surrounding decisions made by groups – agreements, collective choices, projects involving large and diverse teams and communities, and so on – where the actions of one individual do not have a decisive impact. A separate dilemma for which economics had no answer was what motivates people to comply with formal requirements that constrain or restrict their personal interests or comfort. This is where cross-cultural studies supplement economic theory with insights into social norms that are unique to different cultures, influence the formation and functioning of institutions, and serve as scripts for socially acceptable or unacceptable behavior in complying with requirements and honoring agreements.

Social norms define desirable, acceptable, and legitimate behavior within a community. Failure to comply with them produces tangible negative consequences for the violator: condemnation, hate, exclusion from the group, reduced trust, social “exile” – difficulties finding employment, building relationships, establishing cooperation, and so on. Over time, patterns of proper behavior become habitual and are automatically reproduced by members of the community – a cultural orientation is formed, more simply referred to as a national mentality. In new institutional economics, this is called systemic consistency – when social norms arise in response to fundamental dilemmas of life and become fixed within the range of what the community considers acceptable definitions of good and evil.

For example, with an overall level of social trust no higher than approximately 30%, with 74.9% of the population trusting “people I know” and 27.4% trusting people “I am meeting for the first time,” it is hardly surprising that in Ukraine, for serious cooperation, it is often more important to be “one of us” than to be a professional. As someone aptly noted in a Facebook comment: “Ukrainians trust people, not policy.” The established social norm of distrust toward outsiders, based on formal markers, produces stable patterns of behavior that in everyday language we call cronyism, corruption, or nepotism.

In Ukraine, for serious cooperation, it is more important to be “one of us” than to be a professional

So what makes people with very different personality traits and life experiences reproduce social norms literally “on autopilot”? Usually, consequences – negative ones, in the form of punishment, or positive ones, in the form of incentives. Incentives for complying with social norms include economic ones – proper behavior is cheaper; interaction-based ones – proper behavior accelerates desired cooperation; and reputational ones – proper behavior legitimizes me as one of “our own,” reliable and safe. The consequences of violating social norms are the same, only in reverse: improper behavior obstructs cooperation, leads to losses and expenses, and marks me out from the group as an outsider, unreliable, and dangerous.

A telling example of social norms in action is the established perception within different social media bubbles of what is and is not appropriate to discuss at a given moment, and how it should be discussed. This existed long before the invasion, which merely intensified these norms. One might think that on social media everyone can arrange their own space as they wish – for example, by unfollowing “triggering” personalities in order not to interact with their content. Yet an emotional manifesto in an instructive style, such as “I am so sick of those who … [insert any topic or behavior], and they had better … [insert advice its recipients did not ask for],” is not only widespread, but also a kind of friend-or-foe signal among like-minded people regarding the subject of that unsolicited advice.

But the most interesting part of studying social norms begins when we need to determine the motivation behind behavior that is not based on rational self-interest. This is one of the key challenges of economic modeling, because the motivator of increasing personal benefit or reducing personal risk clearly does not work in such cases. Even principles of ethics and morality do not provide a complete explanation for certain behavioral patterns in different cultures. For example, why is the meticulousness with which promises, contractual terms, and verbal agreements are honored so different in, say, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy, and Malaysia? Why does the answer “yes” in Germany mean an affirmative response, while in India it may mean almost anything – from “yes” to “no,” “perhaps,” “I cannot say,” or “I do not know”? Here, cross-cultural studies provide insights because they specifically examine such motivators of social behavior.

The point is that economists, when analyzing the behavior of large groups, operate on the principle that a person is capable of rationally and consistently comparing their behavior with established abstract principles in different situations – “am I acting properly?” At the same time, the starting level of analysis in such a case is the individual, without taking into account the effect of the group to which the person belongs. For example, in the United States, the most individualistic culture in the world, and in other Anglo-Saxon and Western cultures, personal preferences and interests have the greatest influence on decision-making. In Southern and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, as well as in Asia, Africa, the Arab world, and the Pacific region, however, “what influential people will say” is extremely important, and fundamental decisions are never made individually or solely on the basis of personal interests. Consequently, open disagreement, remarks, or comments by subordinates to managers during meetings, as well as blunt statements to other people, especially in public, are the norm in most individualistic cultures, while in most collectivist cultures they are a kind of taboo, the violation of which entails undesirable consequences.

Several decades of research show that we are more likely to comply with formal requirements that restrict our interests or freedoms when we consider those requirements fair. In this regard, the decisive role is played by:

• how well the formal requirement “fits” – an unscientific but illustrative word – into established social norms: is it acceptable to act this way;
• activation, through the requirement’s rootedness in social norms, of one of four motivators for compliance with social norms: pride, respect, disapproval, shame – what will I feel as a result of my actions;
• the possibility of co-creating or discussing the requirement while it is being formulated – can I influence the content of the requirement;
• neutrality – non-discrimination and absence of corruption – in the procedure by which the requirement is adopted – is the requirement definitely not “tailored” to someone’s interests;
• respectful treatment by those who create the requirement toward those whom it will affect – the requirement does not devalue, humiliate, or insult me.

For example, according to data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for 2023, Ukrainians are certainly against corruption in words and regard it as a serious problem: approximately 53% of citizens consider giving bribes, “unofficial” gifts, or services “never justifiable”; approximately 52% declare that they are prepared to defend their rights before bureaucrats; yet 47% would resort to such actions in order to resolve an important matter for themselves. At the same time, 56% cite disbelief in the effectiveness of such actions as the reason for the absence of meaningful steps to combat corruption. In particular, 56% do not trust the authorities as a force fighting corruption, while 51% do not trust anti-corruption civil society organizations in this role. In other words, corruption is bad, but when you really need something – it is acceptable. And in general, “corruption cannot be defeated” is still what the majority of our citizens believe. In other words, corruption in Ukraine is a form of social norm reinforced by distrust of most of the institutions that are supposed to fight it.

In addition to mass patterns of behavior, social norms also shape the framework for the creation and development of formal institutions: laws and regulations, government bodies and agencies, the media, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and so on. For example, because of deeply rooted distrust in Ukraine toward institutions and toward people outside one’s own social bubble, trust in adopted laws and policies and implemented reforms directly correlates with personal trust in the people leading those changes. “Depersonalized” major changes that are not tied to a socially acute problem do not receive sufficient publicity in Ukraine and, consequently, do not attract mass attention or support. The “face” of change may be a legislator or public figure who initiated it, or any opinion leader – activist, journalist, and so on – who actively promotes, explains, and supports the changes.

According to Vox Ukraine, before the invasion Ukrainians considered the most important reforms to be anti-corruption reform at 81.5%, healthcare reform at 51.9%, judicial reform at 46.7%, and education reform at 41.2%. Tax reform at 29.1%, harmonization with the European Union at 17.8%, and decentralization at 8.7%, for example, clearly lagged behind in Ukrainians’ ranking of importance. At the same time, the success of reforms was assessed primarily according to two criteria: reducing corruption and the embezzlement of funds at 71%, and improving the well-being of Ukrainians at 63%.

Under wartime conditions, the highest priorities for reform changed, but the reforms perceived as least important remained approximately the same as before the invasion. The top three most important reforms are the military at 68.4%, digitalization of public services at 61.5%, and the creation of anti-corruption bodies at 55%. Among the least important reforms are decentralization at 38%, education at 36%, judicial reform at 33%, and tax reform at 29%. Accordingly, the level of public interest and mass involvement in profound changes in areas about which Ukrainians know little or nothing will be lower. Resistance to uncomfortable but necessary decisions in such areas will probably be higher as well, because “who needs this – it would be better to … [insert a simple populist solution].”

Williams demonstrated in his research the formative influence of deeply rooted social norms on the formal institutional environment and on the implementation of rules and requirements. Since institutions are “self-imposed constraints that people define and accept as the basis for making collective choices,” it is social norms that decisively influence which institutions are considered important or unimportant and how people should properly interact with them. We should remember that social norms are a group phenomenon, not an individual one. One person cannot simply decide that, for example, “corruption is bad” or “famous public figures may be forgiven for offenses that we do not forgive people with less social capital” and expect the entire country to follow. Such a decision is formed only at the community level, so there is a high probability that the norms shared by the majority within a particular bubble will become established.

And until a social norm is defined by the community as approved or disapproved, there will either be no stable mass behavior associated with it, or there will be conflict between groups within the community over the relevance of a change affecting that norm. A vivid example is the “shitstorms” surrounding vaccination, because there is no social consensus on its importance in general, not only regarding COVID-19; discussions surrounding the trident on the shield of the Motherland Monument, because social attitudes toward the decolonization of remnants of Soviet symbolism have not been fully worked through; mass outrage among men over the introduction of women-only train compartments, because the established value of freedom is approximately 17–30% more important to Ukrainians than equality, justice, and responsibility. According to an analysis of the profile of Ukrainians based on retrospective sociological data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Razumkov Centre, the Rating Sociological Group, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 73% of Ukrainians value freedom more highly than equality.

Social norms are of two types:

• descriptive – they describe habitual behavior, meaning how the majority within a bubble acts;
• injunctive – they describe predominantly approved or disapproved behavior, meaning what the majority within a bubble considers right or wrong.

It is noteworthy that habitual behavior, meaning how things are usually done, especially in polarized societies, may not coincide with injunctive behavior, meaning how things are considered to be properly done.

For example, according to a number of studies compiled by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 34% of Ukrainians consider everyday corruption part of the mentality, 41% are convinced that they cannot obtain a service, including a public service, without a bribe, and 17% justify corrupt behavior as a necessity. At the same time, 23–42% admit that they have given gifts or expressions of gratitude to representatives of the authorities. In other words, everyday corruption in Ukraine qualifies as a descriptive social norm. However, corruption is not an injunctive norm in Ukraine, because the majority of the population considers it a problem and regards reforms aimed at eliminating it as among the most important. According to recent data from the Razumkov Centre, 61% of Ukrainians believe that giving a bribe to an official in order to resolve one’s problem is unjustifiable under any circumstances, while 28.5% consider it justifiable in some cases, in most cases, or always. This dichotomy partly explains the coexistence of the desire to be able to “sort things out” informally on an individual level with acute public outrage over “money in sofas” belonging to publicly exposed corrupt officials.

A similar situation exists with the norm of academic integrity – in simple terms, not cheating, not plagiarizing, and not presenting someone else’s work as your own. At present, plagiarism in the academic works of numerous public figures, including those in the public sector, is an established fact, while cheating in schools is widely normalized at the family level – because “who needs that school knowledge in real life,” “nothing will happen if you cheat,” “you can get ahead in life through connections.” Consequently, plagiarism is a descriptive norm for Ukrainians and is close to becoming an injunctive one – because cheating is supposedly bad, but if you really need to, then you can. It is noteworthy that students assess the combined importance of luck and connections in finding employment as higher than the importance of their own efforts: in business – luck at 23%, connections at 26%, own efforts at 51%; in the public sector – luck at 18%, connections at 45%, own efforts at 37%. Thus, academic dishonesty in Ukraine is very much a social norm, both descriptive and injunctive.

We can therefore see that the ability and willingness to build and reform formal institutions, as well as the directions in which this will be done, depend significantly on established social norms. However, in addition to the framework of social norms, the effectiveness and reformability of institutions are influenced by their interaction and synchronization: the extent to which regulatory requirements contradict or complement one another; the extent to which decisions by related institutions complement one another; and whether there is an overall logic in the decisions of different institutions involved in regulating a large process or sector, such as education, healthcare, taxation, and so on. In Ukraine, formal institutions are not fully synchronized in their decision-making and regulatory requirements, which not only often contradict one another but also require interpretations that may vary considerably. For example, when the tax authorities and courts interpret the same action by a taxpayer in diametrically opposite ways, the taxpayer develops distrust not only toward the institutions involved in that particular situation, but also toward the meta-institution of the “state” as a whole. And the presumption of taxpayer guilt entrenches this distrust, which subsequently hardens, among other things, into the social norm “I do not want to pay taxes because they will be stolen or used inefficiently,” which then guides citizens’ behavior on a mass scale. According to CASE Ukraine, the top two reasons Ukrainians do not want to pay taxes are excessively low income levels at 80.3% and fears that the money paid will be stolen or spent inefficiently at 73.6%.

Noticeable polarization within society also does not contribute to the speed or effectiveness of reforms – sociological research points to two key causes of division among Ukrainians: political conflicts at 62% and mutual accusations at 59%. Therefore, when profound social change is needed, one of the most critical mistakes is underestimating the time and effort required for fundamental institutional transformation – because institutions are precisely what direct social behavior and contain national mentality in the same way that a riverbed contains a river. Institutions are divided into fast-changing ones – usually formal, such as legislation, organizational structures, policies, and programs – and slow-changing ones – usually informal, such as national mentality, values, beliefs, and behavioral norms. While a law can be written or amended over a period of months or years, some levels of national culture change over approximately 50–100 years. Consequently, attempts to “stretch” advanced modern laws over a society living according to norms that are several decades or even several centuries old are doomed to failure from the outset.

For example, in a society where the law is applied selectively and unevenly, and where the majority of the population does not trust the bodies responsible for maintaining law, order, and justice, corporate governance, including in the public sector but not only there, will not function fully. This is because it entails a number of voluntary self-restraints on the part of managers, the violation of which will lead to “nothing happening” because technically no law has been broken. For example, dissolving a supervisory board in order to dismiss, say, the chair of the management board of a state-owned organization and then forming a new board is a gross violation of corporate governance, yet it is a completely legal step. The concept of corporate governance is based on the existence of requirements and mechanisms that help the relevant body manage an organization not only effectively but also ethically, so that the interests of all stakeholders are balanced. And a society that has not yet recognized the need for “the same rules and consequences for everyone” at the level of legislative requirements is unlikely to be ready to comply with ethical restrictions, especially when temptations are great and indulging them brings no consequences.

How, under these conditions, does the social norm of the rule of law function in Ukraine? Read about it in the next column.

Source: NV.ua