
Socio-Political Views of Ukrainians: Identity, Patriotism, and History (August 4–9, 2026)
On August 4–9, 2026, Rating Group conducted a nationwide survey on identity, patriotism, historical issues, and political attitudes.

On August 4–9, 2026, Rating Group conducted a nationwide survey on identity, patriotism, historical issues, and political attitudes.

A strong national identity is, first and foremost, about shared experience rather than language or origin.

We live in a time when every day begins with the news and ends with checking whether that news is actually true. A time when the country’s agenda can change overnight, and suddenly everything that seemed stable turns out to be fragile.

The preamble to the Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information” states that this Law determines the procedure for exercising and ensuring everyone’s right of access to information held by public information holders, as well as to information of public interest.

Adults cry too. And sometimes they do not even know what to do next. Today, Ukrainians as a nation and a people have been forced to grow up more than many others.

We live in a world in which external limitations on the individual are becoming fewer and fewer. This concerns not only freedom of movement or access to information. The very architecture of human life is changing: what only a few centuries ago was determined by one’s place of birth, social status, territory, access to knowledge, profession, or tradition today depends to a much greater extent on personal choice.

We continue the webinar series of the “Youth for the Future of Ukraine” project, and today we are discussing perhaps one of the most demonized words in the context of the Ukrainian church conflict — the word “compromise.”

Archpriest Heorhii Khodun, Volyn Orthodox Theological Academy, Orthodox Church of Ukraine The years of Russia’s full-scale aggression have significantly transformed perceptions of Ukraine’s post-war recovery.

The rule of law is a social norm that serves as an interface between the informal system of unwritten rules and the formal requirements of legislation in a country.

Hennadii Khrystokin, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor In the previous article, we demonstrated that the common good does not emerge through the proclamation of the “right”

Among the most difficult norms of our society to explain is the combination of behavioral patterns that, formally speaking, should be mutually exclusive.

There is a well-known observation that aptly describes our situation: people who use the same words often mean entirely different things. “Dignity,” “justice,” and “unity” are part of the vocabulary of virtually every public discussion about Ukraine’s future.

“If it has to be explained, then it does not need to be explained” – one of the most popular expressions defining the boundary between “our own” and “outsiders” in our society. Immediate affinity and a minimum of radical otherness are critical prerequisites for productive interaction.

The authors of the article proceed from the thesis voiced by President Zelenskyy upon the adoption of Law of Ukraine No. 3894-IX “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations” (referred to as the law on spiritual independence): an independent state must also be spiritually independent.

Maryna Starodubska, cross-cultural interaction consultant, Adjunct Professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, and author How social norms govern our behavior When implementing profound social change, simple

I would like to begin my presentation by returning to the paper “Faith in One Church: Myth or Reality?”, presented by Doctor of Theology, Professor of the Kyiv Theological Academy Serhii Bortnyk at the webinar “Myths and Prejudices as Obstacles to the Unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.”

Million-scale donations for the needs of the military, often without demands for formal reporting, combined with the desire to pay as little tax as possible or not to pay taxes at all. A willingness to share one’s last possessions in order to help even not particularly close acquaintances whose homes have been destroyed, combined with corrupt schemes of an audacity unheard of even in a country that is not at war.

Edited transcript of a broadcast on the Pryamyi TV channel. Natalka Fitsych spoke with Myroslav Marynovych – a human rights activist, founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, dissident, and political prisoner of the Soviet era.

Millions in donations for the needs of the military, often without demands for formal reporting, alongside the desire to pay as little tax as possible or not to pay taxes at all. A willingness to share one’s last possessions to help even not-so-close acquaintances whose homes have been destroyed, alongside corrupt schemes of an audacity unheard of even in a country that is not at war.

Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky impresses me with how, having been raised in a Polish aristocratic environment, he managed to understand the character and destiny of Ukrainians and describe very clearly the reasons behind their defeats. Moreover, he repeatedly addressed us with warnings.

“This is not only a war for territory. It is a war for our souls, for our identity, for our values, because this is an existential war”.

I believe that there are people in government who sincerely care about Ukraine’s victory and prosperity. Nor is there any shortage of such people outside government.

After its defeat in the Second World War, Germany lay in ruins comparable perhaps only to present-day Bakhmut, Soledar, and Avdiivka. Overall, 45% of the housing stock on the territory of the Third Reich was destroyed during the Second World War.

To prevail in the war and win the future, it is not enough to love one’s homeland. It is not enough to dislike Russians. It is not enough to speak Ukrainian, cultivate the cult of Stepan Bandera, or even be prepared to kill and die for Ukraine. We need to have in our imagination a vision of Ukraine – a dream of a Ukrainian “city upon a hill.”

When cohesion policy is discussed in Ukraine, the focus is almost always on the territorial dimension: disparities between Kyiv and the regions, between large cities and the periphery, and between donor communities and recipient communities.

Whereas previously there was a strict Byzantine binary of “Church – state,” now there is a more intriguing triangle of “Church – society – state.” As with any transition from 2D to 3D, the Church-political picture has become more complex, but it now corresponds more closely to the rapidly evolving realities in Ukraine.

Ukrainian political culture is based on principles that have sound and progressive origins, but in Ukrainian political realities they sometimes cease to serve their original purpose.

For a considerable part of its history, Ukraine was under the oppression of neighboring states, subjected to attacks from all sides, censorship, and subjugation. For years, our history was rewritten and distorted, our traumas were silenced and denied, our intelligentsia was murdered, and attempts were made to destroy our language.

“Ukraine’s transformation of weakness into strength is not the cunning of ressentiment but a mythological transformation. It is how a child becomes an adult,” reflects

A conversation about the future: what it could look like and who is responsible for shaping it. Below is a summary of a dialogue between