Based on the materials of the article: Melnychuk I., Hud B. “How Can Ukrainian Orthodoxy Be United?” // Bulletin of the Precarpathian University. Series: Political Science. Issue 18, 2024.
The authors of the article proceed from the thesis voiced by President Zelenskyy upon the adoption of Law of Ukraine No. 3894-IX “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations” (referred to as the law on spiritual independence): an independent state must also be spiritually independent. In their view, this formulation aptly describes the logic according to which inter-Orthodox relations in Ukraine have developed over the past three decades, and this is precisely why the question of Church unity is not purely religious, but also a matter of statehood.
Historical Background: Why the Church Question Is So Painful
The researchers recall that Christianity in the Ukrainian lands has a long continuity — from the preaching of the Apostle Andrew the First-Called on the hills of Kyiv to the official baptism of Kyivan Rus by Volodymyr the Great in 988. The authors draw attention to a pattern that they consider crucial for understanding all subsequent history: the development of the Church in the Ukrainian lands has always been closely connected with the development of statehood. The Church flourished together with Kyivan Rus under Yaroslav the Wise, declined together with the state as a result of internal strife and external attacks, and was revived together with successive attempts at restoring statehood — during the time of Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi and later during the period of the Cossack state, when the Orthodox hierarchy of the Kyiv Metropolis was restored. In 1596, some bishops, seeking to preserve the Ukrainian spirit of the Church under Polish pressure, entered into union with the Vatican — thus giving rise to the Greek Catholic tradition.
After the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Muscovite state, the Ukrainian Church found itself within the Moscow Patriarchate — and, according to the authors, this is where the root of the present-day conflict lies. The brief revival of autocephaly at the beginning of the twentieth century, associated with the name of Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi, was interrupted by Soviet occupation. Only in 1991, with the restoration of independence, did the formula “an independent state — an independent Church” once again become relevant: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church emerged, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church came out of the underground, and the then Metropolitan Filaret embarked on a course toward autocephaly. At the same time, a significant part of the former structure of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine remained within it — under the new name of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Why 2008 Did Not Bring Unification
The authors examine in detail the failed attempt of 2008, when Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew personally came to Kyiv in an effort to resolve the issue of the schism. At that time, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was regarded as the only canonically recognized structure around which the others were supposed to unite. However, according to the researchers, the preparatory process immediately demonstrated how strongly the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate depended on its governing center — the Moscow Patriarchate — which made every possible effort to prevent unification from taking place. It was precisely this failure, the authors argue, that prompted the Ecumenical Patriarchate to change its strategy: it became clear that genuine unification was possible only around Ukrainian Churches independent of Moscow.
Subsequent developments were accelerated by the political context: Euromaidan, the Revolution of Dignity and, especially, Russian aggression in 2014 clearly divided the Churches according to the principle of “whose side they were on.” This created the social and political conditions for the Unification Council at Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv on December 15, 2018, where representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and part of the episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate formed the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which on January 6, 2019, received the Tomos of Autocephaly from Patriarch Bartholomew.
The scholars emphasize that the Tomos was not the end of the process, but merely its foundation: obtaining a document confirming canonicity proved considerably easier than achieving genuine internal unity within Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Five years after the Tomos, a unified community centered around the Tomos had still not emerged.
Four Theoretical Scenarios for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate
The authors identify four possible paths that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate could take and analyze each of them separately.
- Direct negotiations with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine mediated by the Ecumenical Patriarch. According to the researchers, this scenario would have the most positive consequences for the country, but at the same time it is the least likely, since, in the authors’ view, the unwillingness of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to engage in dialogue is the principal obstacle. The scholars note that even when the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate itself expressed a desire to communicate with the authorities, this opportunity was not used — whereas it should have become an occasion to seek points of common ground on both sides.
- Autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate or the status of an exarchate within it. This path would require the episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and completely sever its ties with Moscow — a step that would open the possibility of concelebration between bishops of the two Churches. The researchers acknowledge that this scenario would be logical and advantageous if the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate genuinely seeks to escape the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, but they emphasize that the ideological barriers constructed over decades are practically impossible to dismantle under present conditions.
- Self-proclaimed autocephaly, following the model of the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate from 1992 to 2018. The authors consider this option unsuccessful and without prospects: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate’s thirty-year experience under precisely such a model was accompanied by accusations of “non-canonicity” and “lack of grace” from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, so repeating this scenario today appears illogical.
- Obtaining autocephaly from Moscow. The researchers consider this scenario practically impossible because it would contradict the very logic of the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church: losing its Ukrainian component would mean losing almost half of the structure of the Moscow Patriarchate and the collapse of the idea of “Moscow as the Third Rome,” while the Kremlin makes no secret publicly of the fact that it regards the Church as an instrument of influence over Ukraine.
None of these paths, the authors conclude, currently appears realistic in the immediate future — primarily because of the unwillingness of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate itself to sever its canonical and political ties with Moscow.
The Role of the State and the Question of Trust
The authors insist that the state should not distance itself from the Church question: ignoring it only deepens social hostility, whereas continuous dialogue can mitigate it. This is particularly relevant in the context of the law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Activities of Religious Organizations,” adopted by the Verkhovna Rada and unofficially referred to as the law banning the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The researchers regard it as an important and necessary step toward protecting the country’s religious space, but immediately caution that prohibiting ties with Moscow is only the first, initial step rather than a solution to the problem as such.
The authors devote particular attention to the mechanics of parishes transferring from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, a process that intensified considerably after the full-scale invasion. The typical scenario they describe is as follows: the community gathers and votes to change its jurisdiction, after which it almost invariably splits — some parishioners support the transfer, while others, often together with the priest, continue to adhere to the previous jurisdiction. The scholars warn that this very scenario risks being repeated in an even more acute form during the practical implementation of the new law, and insist that transfer should be the result of negotiations and a gradual process rather than coercion or a one-time administrative decision.
The authors also draw particular attention to the role of the laity: the Church is constituted not only by hierarchs but by the entire community of believers, and therefore the consciousness of the ordinary parishioner — understanding which Church he or she actually belongs to and why — is no less important a front in the struggle for unity than decisions made by the episcopate. The researchers note that for decades the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate cultivated among parishioners a sense of belonging to the “only true,” canonical and grace-bearing Church, while other Ukrainian jurisdictions were described as schismatic. Therefore, genuine unification, according to the authors, will require some believers and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to acknowledge the erroneous nature of this long-standing narrative, and this is not an administrative process but a deeply personal, almost penitential one.
The Authors’ Conclusions
- There is currently insufficient public demand for the unification of the Churches specifically as an institutional structure. At the same time, there is a clear demand for the Church to be Ukrainian in spirit. The authors interpret this as a sign of growing national consciousness that is also extending into the religious sphere.
- The leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate does not demonstrate genuine readiness for unification and continues to maintain canonical and political ties with Moscow, despite the fact that some clergy and believers within this Church gravitate toward a Ukrainian jurisdiction.
- The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, despite having the Tomos, has nevertheless failed to develop a clear strategy and roadmap for genuine unification around itself, while unity between clergy and laity within the Orthodox Church of Ukraine itself, according to the researchers, is also not at the highest level. The authors emphasize that instead of working together, one often observes confrontation between two camps — with one side accusing the other of lacking patriotism, while the other fears that unification will lead to a new schism.
- For almost thirty years after independence, the state practically refrained from intervening in religious processes, and only the full-scale war forced it to approach the Church question as a matter of national security.
- Society as a whole remains divided over the Church question, while the process of unification itself, according to the authors, is not a matter of one law or one year, but work that will take decades and require coordinated and consistent efforts from three sides simultaneously: the state, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and civil society. The researchers also suggest that even if unification succeeds, some believers may consciously choose another ecclesiastical jurisdiction — and, in their view, this should not be regarded as a failure of the process, but rather as its natural limit.
