Let us break down which manifestations of national culture, or mentality, influence the application of the rule of law in the country
Maryna Starodubska, cross-cultural interaction consultant, adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, and author of books
Continued. Read the first part, “Law-Abiding Behavior in Ukraine. How Mentality ‘Eats Policy for Breakfast’,” here.
The rule of law is a social norm that serves as an interface between the informal system of unwritten rules and the formal requirements of legislation in a country. It encourages people, when choosing appropriate behavior in everyday situations, to be guided by formal regulatory requirements rather than whims, traditions, advice from “trusted insiders,” or orders from people in positions of power. At the same time, the degree of law-abiding behavior and the prevalence of the rule of law depend significantly on national culture, including its underlying foundations, values, and behavioral norms regarding what is and is not considered acceptable. The rule of law functions only in societies where compliance with legal requirements is perceived as mandatory and where failure to comply usually brings negative consequences. Where “the severity of laws is compensated for by the optional nature of their enforcement,” the application of the rule of law becomes complicated and open to different interpretations.
The essence of the rule of law is that citizens must comply with legal requirements regardless of their personal opinion about the “fairness” of those requirements or about who created them. In practice, this means voluntarily following the law because “that is what the law says,” along with actively monitoring how these requirements are observed within the community. How rigorously and consistently this compliance takes place depends greatly on the values and norms of national culture, including respect for rules, trust in “insiders” and “outsiders,” and attitudes toward informal agreements. For example, cultural norms determine whether you bang on the door of neighbors whose music is blasting in the middle of the night or immediately call the police. Or whether you report to management a colleague who has violated the corporate code of conduct, or a neighbor who failed to sort their waste when no one else saw it.
Notably, the rule of law operates at the societal rather than individual level, because individuals comply with legal requirements but do not create the institutions that produce them. And although institutions are staffed by people, the lawmaking process is inherently collective and requires discussion, compromise, the search for common interests, and the use of mechanisms of influence. This means that for the rule of law to function in a country, citizens must trust the institutions that create, implement, and safeguard compliance with legal norms.
In Ukraine, however, institutional trust is extremely problematic. According to Razumkov Centre research from 2021–2023, the state bodies involved in lawmaking, law enforcement, and the judiciary not only have among the lowest levels of trust but are also the objects of the strongest active distrust among Ukrainians, consistently from year to year despite the war. For example, in 2023, 39.1% of Ukrainians trusted the government and 52.2% did not; 36.2% trusted the Verkhovna Rada and 56.3% did not; 61.3% trusted the National Police and 30.7% did not; 27.8% trusted the prosecutor’s office and 60.3% did not; 19% trusted the judicial system and 69.7% did not. Analysis of nationwide sociological surveys by other institutions that conduct them regularly produces similar results.
This leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that in countries with low social trust and a “desynchronization” of values between institutions and citizens, as in Ukraine but not only here, the rule of law will, to put it mildly, “limp.” A number of scholars who recognize the influence of national culture and social norms on a country’s economic outcomes, including North, Williamson, Roland, Acemoglu, Alesina, and Robinson, have found that the synchronization of regulatory requirements, meaning formal institutions – Level 2 in Williamson’s model – and social norms, meaning informal institutions – Level 1 in Williamson’s model – determines the degree of law-abiding behavior in a country.
The content and interpretation of social norms and legal requirements must not contradict one another – what is written in the law and how it is interpreted should align. Does an incorrectly submitted electronic tax declaration through a taxpayer’s online account mean that this person is evading taxes? That depends on whether the tax authority generally operates on a presumption of the taxpayer’s guilt or innocence.
The role of legal requirements in regulating social behavior must correspond to established social norms. The degree of public condemnation or approval of local vandalism against newly opened kiosks belonging to a well-known bakery chain in Drohobych will depend on:
– trust in the government bodies that issued permits for their opening;
– perceptions of whether other market participants had a fair opportunity to open similar kiosks;
– confidence that negative consequences will follow for such vandalism.
It is worth noting that Ukraine ranked 115th out of 150 countries in the 2023 World Economics global rule-of-law ranking, based on World Bank data, with the rule of law functioning at 37.6% out of a theoretical maximum of 90%, since the rule of law does not function at 100% in any society. Ukraine was positioned alongside the Philippines, Mauritania, Laos, and Gabon.
According to the latest available World Justice Project Rule of Law Index for 2022, Ukraine ranked 76th out of 140 countries, with a score of 0.53 compared with a global average of 0.56. Since 2015, however, Ukraine’s rule-of-law score has fluctuated between 0.50 and 0.53, meaning that it has not changed significantly. Both rankings include developing countries worldwide, including the post-Soviet space, Africa, Latin America, the Pacific region, Asia, and others. Their indicators are derived from assessments of several parameters: absence of corruption, constraints on government powers, open government, fundamental human rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, and civil and criminal justice. It is therefore unsurprising that strengthening the rule of law is among the key reforms required for Ukraine’s future accession to the EU and among the expectations of our allies and international partners during the current war.
Cross-cultural studies devote considerable attention not only to the overall degree of social trust but also to the ratio of trust toward “insiders” and “outsiders” in different countries. This ratio offers explanations and clues as to why certain profound changes or reforms may “stall” or fail to work. Delhey and Welzel specifically studied the ratio of trust in “insiders” and “outsiders” across 50 countries and identified correlations between this indicator and characteristic social behavior in four groups of countries, or national cultures:
– cultures that trust only “outsiders” – approximately 1.5% – meaning people outside the closest trusted circle who are perceived as “impartial” or “knowledgeable in the field.” This is the smallest group. Notably, Poland appears here with a very low score, almost on the border with distrust of everyone;
– cultures that trust no one – approximately 13.5% – where trust must be built over time, even when dealing with acquaintances. This group includes parts of Africa and South America, Italy, South Korea, Romania, and Moldova, and, notably, the Netherlands almost on the border with the group that trusts only “outsiders”;
– cultures that generally trust everyone – approximately 37% – societies with high levels of trust that tend to trust people initially unless they see signs of dangerous behavior. The leaders here are Scandinavia, Anglo-Saxon cultures, and part of Europe, while lower-scoring members include parts of Africa and South America, Spain, West Germany, and Serbia;
– cultures that trust only “their own” – approximately 48% – meaning only the closest circle connected by family, mutual obligations, and other ties. This group includes Ukraine, parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, China, Russia, Turkey, Cyprus, and East Germany. Notably, this is the largest of the four groups.
Trust in “outsiders” emerges in society when citizens become less dependent on external circumstances through effective institutions and the possibility of interacting without personal connections. When, in situations where acquaintances and connections were once necessary, it becomes possible simply to fill out a form, submit an application, or follow a straightforward procedure to obtain assistance or information, people become accustomed to relying not only on those connected to them by blood, relationships, or mutual obligations. Religion and political regime also matter. Countries with a Protestant heritage have historically displayed higher levels of trust in “outsiders,” while countries with a post-Soviet legacy, for example, tend to have very low levels. Yet it is notable that when effective institutions develop, the influence of these factors on social norms weakens. In other words, successful reforms allow renewed institutions to become “our own” in the eyes of the citizens they serve and thereby gain a chance to earn trust. One vivid example is decentralization in Ukraine: effective local government can increase the trust of residents in a particular region, while those same residents’ distrust of the central government remains unchanged.
Ukraine lies almost on the boundary between the group that “trusts no one” and the group that “trusts only its own.” This makes Ukrainian society deeply distrustful of difference and worldview diversity in general and, given historical factors, particularly distrustful of the institution of the “state.” This helps explain our deeply rooted tendency to trust individuals rather than systems and makes public discussion of mistakes or areas for improvement more difficult, because different camps interpret such discussions sharply as attacks on specific individuals. Recall the public conflicts surrounding the “eggs at UAH 17 each” and the “summer/winter jackets”, which quickly descended into mutual accusations. The same “trust in our own” mechanism operated in the public scandal over plagiarism in the dissertations of two ministers of education, Shkarlet and Lisovyi, where the only difference between the cases lay in the individuals involved and their backgrounds, and therefore in the degree of support they received from different social bubbles.
Let us now break down which specific manifestations of national culture, or mentality, influence the application of the rule of law in a country.
1. Autonomy and egalitarianism are generally characteristic of functioning democracies with medium-to-high levels of individualism, where citizens are regarded as morally equal and deserving of equal protection under the law. In egalitarian societies, holding a high office, possessing wealth, or having other markers of status does not imply privileges or concessions when it comes to regulatory requirements. And if a person of higher status nevertheless manages to secure preferential treatment, this provokes deep public outrage and resistance and leads to negative reputational and career consequences for that person. Such societies usually have higher standards of transparency and law-abiding behavior for public figures and more rigorous application of regulatory requirements and sanctions to individuals and organizations in general. Countries with these characteristics tend to have a medium-to-low power distance, meaning that inequalities in wealth, status, office, expertise, or activism are not seen as signs that one person is more valuable than another before the law. Accordingly, the fundamental rule-of-law principle that “the law must be obeyed because it is the law” functions most fully in autonomous and egalitarian cultures and is a foundational factor of functioning democracy.
Such societies include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia, and the Netherlands.
2. Interdependence and embeddedness are characteristic of collectivist countries with hierarchical social relations and uneven, or even selective, effectiveness of formal institutions. Citizens do not particularly trust these institutions and prefer to interact with them through “trusted intermediaries.” Such societies also tend to have high power distance and a somewhat normalized tolerance of inequality in wealth, authority, status, and the degree to which legal requirements are applied. This, in turn, produces widespread passivity and demand for paternalism from leaders, whether of the country or of an organization, based on the belief that decisions made “at the top” are difficult to influence, especially if you are not a “star” or an “opinion leader.” In countries with these characteristics, higher-status individuals consider themselves, and are often perceived by others, as more “important” and more entitled to preferential treatment when the rule of law is applied. Yet this simultaneously generates resentment. As a result, the principle that “the law must be obeyed because it is the law” does not function in interdependent and embedded cultures because, alongside the formal norm of the rule of law, powerful informal norms also operate: mutual obligations, hierarchical relations, “proper” behavior, approval by an important group, and perceptions of the “fairness” of the law and of the individuals who created it.
Such societies include countries in Africa, the Arab world, South America, Asia, including Central and Southeast Asia, and parts of Southern and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine.
3. Uncertainty avoidance and risk tolerance. The higher the level of uncertainty avoidance in a country, the more unevenly the rule of law is applied, because citizens’ behavior is guided by several other comparably important factors: obligations toward their closest circle, the need to appear “proper,” and approval or support from an important group. In such societies, the use of formal institutional mechanisms to resolve disputes and problems is delayed as long as possible, with preference given to agreements and informal ways of “sorting things out.” And when a case does reach court, going to court is perceived as a “search for truth” or as “punishment of the guilty.”
Low levels of uncertainty avoidance are characteristic of societies with functioning formal institutions, such as Western democracies; societies where fatalism is deeply rooted in national mentality, such as India and parts of Southeast Asia; societies with a long and successful history of struggling for national survival, such as Israel; countries affected by the “resource curse” against a backdrop of underdeveloped institutions, such as Nigeria; and countries that until relatively recently experienced deep influence from Western colonizers with highly autonomous cultures, such as South Africa. In such countries, going to court or using other institutional mechanisms is simply one of several legitimate ways of resolving disputes without necessarily entering into an interpersonal conflict.
High levels of uncertainty avoidance are characteristic, with some exceptions, of threatened societies with historical experience of violence, colonization, pandemics and natural disasters, and difficult border formation under the influence of empires. It is precisely in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance and medium-to-low risk tolerance that the implementation of the rule of law depends on the complexity of the decisions that must be made. The more important and unconventional the decision, the less likely it is to be made without “public support,” approval from “influential people,” and other informal mechanisms. And the greater the influence of a citizen’s status, connections, public perception, and network of mutual obligations on whether consequences for violating formal requirements do or do not follow.
Such societies include Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Asia, including Central Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, most African countries, and the Arab world.
To understand the social norms inherent in a national culture, it is important to study the combination of its values rooted in historical patterns, including climate, landscape, religion, population density, type of government, and other factors, which may promote or hinder the formation of particular social norms. For example, a recent comparative study of values in Ukraine and the EU, shown in the diagrams below, found that EU countries fall into four clusters with different scores on key European values: liberal democracy, gender equality, civic honesty, tolerance toward other ethnic groups, individual autonomy, and personal freedom. Religion and the form of government are significant factors in the formation of these clusters. There is also a substantial gap in these values between “old” and “new” EU member states. As the diagrams show, the values of Ukraine’s national culture move in the same general direction as those of the EU, but Ukraine lags most significantly in liberal democracy, gender equality, civic honesty, individual autonomy, and personal freedom.
So what does all of this mean for the rule of law and institutional reforms in Ukraine? A few conclusions follow.
1. “Just” write it down, start doing it, ban it, or punish it – this will not work. Because formal institutions in the country are interconnected, such as law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts, and have themselves been shaped by social norms such as “I do not trust the state,” any potential profound changes must take these mutual influences into account. Ukraine is a collectivist and embedded society, where circumstances, status, connections, and the support of important people determine a great deal. Severe punishment for violations “on paper,” if applied selectively, produces the opposite of the intended effect. For the rule of law to have a chance of functioning in Ukraine, we should think not in terms of “severity of punishment,” but in terms of identifying the conditions for corruption and informal arrangements embedded in regulatory requirements and processes. We also need to build trust in the institutions that produce and implement regulatory requirements. With high power distance and uncertainty avoidance, combined with low personal freedom, it is more effective to simplify formal requirements and make them more transparent in order to eliminate opportunities for informal “deals” than to emphasize punishment in a system where status can help people avoid it. Institutions perceived as alien, hostile, or illegitimate automatically have little chance of doing anything that citizens will approve of or comply with on a mass scale.
2. Low personal freedom and high embeddedness in social “bubbles” require negotiation. In egalitarian and individualistic cultures, defending one’s own interests and goals, even when others perceive them as excessive or “not appropriate right now,” is normal. Freedom of decision and choice is more valuable in such societies than approval from an “important group,” so the rule of law serves as infrastructure for the neutral resolution of everyday dilemmas. In collectivist and polarized societies with low trust both between citizens and toward the state, regulatory requirements are perceived as the product of an untrusted state that untrusted outsiders may use for their own interests. Multiply this situation by the number of social bubbles, and we have a vast field for facilitated dialogue. Such dialogue must be led by leaders and respected people within the relevant communities because, with Ukraine’s current level of personal freedom at 6.68 out of 9.00 according to the Human Freedom Index, such dialogue either will not happen on its own or will turn into a public brawl. My detailed analysis of the phenomenon of such public fights is available here, but it is worth separately emphasizing how destructive they are today. When 62% of Ukrainians see political conflicts and 59% see mutual accusations as the main causes of social division, it is hardly surprising how readily one social bubble after another amplifies Russian information operations or domestic disinformation. After all, “uniting against someone” is emotionally more satisfying than thinking about the broader consequences because “they [another bubble] live, speak, act, and look the wrong way.”
3. Every time a high-status person faces no consequences for violating formal requirements, citizens receive a license for non-compliance. The inability and unwillingness to admit mistakes and apologize is not only a feature of our polarized and threatened society. It is also characteristic of multi-active cultures, according to Lewis’s model, where individuals are embedded in a number of important groups whose approval and support help them achieve life outcomes. Under such conditions, apologizing means “losing face,” while admitting mistakes is seen as “showing weakness.” And although the deeper ability to apologize and acknowledge mistakes is corrected through reform of the education system, at least at the level of leaders of social bubbles, who in our culture have higher status and greater freedom of decision, it is important to begin setting an example. When failures and scandals arise, problems and systems should be examined rather than individuals attacked. We need to understand that every opinion leader who is “let off the hook” adds years of distrust toward the system in which it happened. And we should recognize that today it may be you who ignores a formal requirement, while tomorrow that same requirement may be ignored “against you.”
Source: nv.ua
